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Abstract 
This paper studies the role of education as a way of reducing private rent seeking 
activities and increasing output. In many underdeveloped economies, for most 
individuals, there is no private return to education.  Nonetheless, according to this 
paper, governments are better off by investing in public education. We view education 
as a means to build personal character, thereby affecting macroeconomic long run 
equilibrium by reducing the number of individuals who are engaged in private rent-
seeking activities. We show that education is more efficient than ordinary law 
enforcement because it has a long-run effect. The policy implication of this result is 
that even when education does not increase human capital, compulsory schooling will 
be beneficial in pulling underdeveloped economies out of poverty. 
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1. Introduction 
Macroeconomists usually view education as a means of accumulating human 
capital. According to this view, individuals acquire skills that enable them to use 
better technologies and become more productive.1 In recent years, however, a body of 
empirical literature has shown that the observed differences in the factors employed in 
production does not explain most of the cross-country variation in income (e.g., 
Caselli (2005)). Other recent papers have shown that education has positive social 
externalities that are not necessarily related to the private accumulation of human 
capital.2 One of the most important social effects of education is crime reduction. 
Lochner and Moretti (2004) showed that schooling significantly reduces the 
probability of incarceration and arrest because of its negative effect on criminal 
behavior. Other studies such as Puech (2005), and Buonanno Leonida (2006, 2009) 
have found a similar relationship between schooling and crime.3 In this paper we 
examine how investing in public education might result in lower crime rates, and 
eventually higher output. We also examine the relative benefits of investing in 
education versus investing in a police force.  
The paper has two theoretical contributions. First, even when there is no private 
return to education, public education still has a positive long run effect on output 
through its positive effect on moral character. Second, in many cases, underdeveloped 
economies are better off in public education than the police force. 
                                                 
1
 See Schultz (1965), Becker (1965, 1993), Nelson and Phelps (1966), Ben-Porath (1967), Mincer 
(1974)  Lucas (1988), Galor and Zeira (1993), Galor and Moav (2004) and Galor and Moav (2006), 
Zeira (2009). 
2
 Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) relate social externalities to education. Usher (1997) discusses the 
positive social effect of education, and Ehrlich (1975) its positive effect on moral character. 
3
 Puech (2005) studied the influence of education on crime in Minas Gerais in Brazil showed that 
education significantly reduces interpersonal crime. Buonanno and Leonida (2006) examined the 
impact of education on criminal activity in Italy and showed that education is negatively correlated 
with delinquency. In a later study (2009) they demonstrated that education reduces crime more 
effectively than labor market opportunities. 
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The paper presents a simple rent seeking model similar to that of Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993). Like their model, a high level of rent seeking activity 
diminishes the return of the legal productive activity (i.e., if the number of thieves in 
the economy is high, it is less profitable to become a legal producer). However, our 
model differs in that it assumes that the decision of whether to become producers or 
thieves does not depend solely on the relative return to each activity, but also on 
individuals' moral character (decent or indecent). The direct consequence of this 
assumption is that aggregate output equilibria depend not only on the relative return to 
each activity, but also and most importantly, on the proportion of decent and indecent 
individuals in the economy.  
Individuals live for two periods- childhood and adulthood. In childhood, moral 
character develops toward either the decent or indecent type. When reaching 
adulthood, he chooses whether to engage in legal productive activities or to become a 
thief. If the adult has developed into a decent type he may only engage in legal 
activities.   
While education does not affect an individual's abilities or skills, it does affect 
the probability to become decent adults. This has two results. First, public education 
might pull underdeveloped economies out of poverty. Second, these economies are 
better off investing in public education than in the police force. The second result 
stems from the long run effect of education versus the short run effect of policing. 
In the main text we provide a basic model with a comparative static analysis that 
demonstrates how aggregate output in equilibrium is related to the number of decent 
individuals in the economy.  Next, we provide two mechanisms by which education 
affects aggregate output through the dynamics of the level of decency.  
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 The first mechanism is based on the assumption that in poor economies, the 
cost of education dominates the potential time saving value of education (babysitter 
effect), but when economies become wealthier, this trend is reversed and the 
babysitter effect dominates the cost of public education. As a result, in poor 
economies the number of indecent individuals is high and the economy is trapped in 
poverty. Compulsory schooling that educates children to decency increases the 
number of decent individuals in the long run and eventually pulls the economy out of 
its poverty trap. 
In the second mechanism, decency is affected by cultural norms and values that 
pass from one generation to the next through social interactions between old and 
young individuals. In this setting, the impact of education is manifested not only in its 
direct affect on moral character, but also in its indirect affect on cultural legacies. This 
mechanism leads to a threshold effect as follows. If the number of decent individuals 
is below some critical point, the level of interaction between decent adults and young 
individuals is low, the number of decent individuals declines and the economy is 
trapped in poverty. If, on the other hand, the number of decent individuals is slightly 
above that critical point, the interaction between decent adults and young individuals 
is sufficiently high, the number of decent individuals rises and the economy starts to 
grow, up to a high level of decency and output.  
When the number of indecent individuals is high, the economy is trapped in 
poverty because the cost of education dominates the potential time saving value of 
education (babysitter effect), compulsory schooling might negate the threshold effect 
and pull the economy out of poverty. Furthermore, unlike the first mechanism, when 
the number of decent individuals exceeds a critical point, education is no longer 
necessary. 
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The notion that education has a positive impact on individuals' decency is 
related to Lochner and Moretti (2004) who discuss possible mechanisms of the effect 
of education on crime, as well as to the strong empirical evidence that the effect of 
education on crime rates does exist. It is also related to the developmental 
psychological theories of Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1973). Kohlberg attributes a 
positive impact on morality to education itself, whereas Piaget attributes it to 
socialization with one's peer group. More recent psychologists dealing with moral 
development such as Gilligan (1982) and Turiel (1998) recognize the importance of 
formal education in understanding and clarifying moral principles and manners of 
behavior. 
As our paper analyzes rent seeking behavior, it also relates to a large literature 
showing that property rights protection positively affects growth.4 In recent years the 
empirical literature has used several factors for measuring property rights and its 
effects on growth and output; for example protection against expropriation risk (see 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005)), property registration under the law (see 
Rohini Pande and Christopher Udry (2005)) and government repudiation of contract 
and corruption (see Knack and Keefer (1995, 1997)). All of the above papers deal 
with legal and economic institutions. Our paper focuses on education and it effect on 
interpersonal property crimes, providing a mechanism that negatively links such 
crimes and public education.  
While all modern economies have both public education and a police force, we 
show that in the context of underdeveloped economies, public education is a better 
economic institution. Our model predicts that the long run benefits of public 
                                                 
4
 See North and Thomas (1973), Mauro (1995), Barro (1997),  Grossman and Kim (1995), Tornell, 
(1997, 1999), Hall and Jones, (1999), Chong and Calderon (2000), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), 
Gradstein (2003), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005). For survey, see also Besley and Ghatak 
(2009).  
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education will always contribute to output, whereas the introduction of a police force 
may not. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 
3 discusses the effect of education on decency and output. Section 4 concludes. 
  
2. The Basic Model 
Consider an overlapping generations' open economy in a one-good world. In 
each period t a generation of individuals of measure one is born. Each individual has a 
single parent and each individual lives through two periods; childhood and adulthood. 
An individual consumes only in adulthood. At the end of his childhood period each 
individual develops either a decent personality (denoted by θ=d) or an indecent 
personality (denoted by θ=nd).  
Each adult in the economy can choose one of the two following types of 
occupations: a decent occupation in which individuals work and produce their own 
income and an indecent occupation in which individuals gain their income by means 
of private rent-seeking activities. We denote decent and indecent occupations by 
O=D,ND, respectively. We assume that each adult has preferences over consumption 
and occupation that depend on his moral type. Individual preferences are presented by 
the following utility function: 

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where υγ −  is a subsistence level of consumption on which people can survive. This 
utility function implies that an indecent adult gains utility from consumption only, 
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whereas the utility of a decent adult depends not only on his consumption level but 
also on the moral aspects of his occupation. 
  
Occupational Choice and Income 
We adopt the main features of the Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) rent 
seeking model. There are two productive activities in the economy: a handcraft 
activity in which an individual can produce α units of output for the market (a 
technical product), and a subsistence crop in which case the individual can produce γ  
units of output such that γ <α.5  
The subsistence crop is not subject to rent seeking as it cannot be stolen or 
expropriated. In contrast, the handcraft product is subject to theft. We assume that the 
rent seeking technology is subject to diminishing returns. If an adult is engaged in 
such an activity the maximum amount of output he can expropriate is β. Note that our 
assumptions on preferences and output imply that a decent adult will never steal, 
whereas an indecent individual may optimally choose to be engaged in either theft or 
productive activity, depending on the return to each activity.  
At the beginning of each period t all adults in the economy must make decisions 
in two sequential stages. In the first stage, they must decide whether to be producers 
or thieves. In the second stage, producers must decide whether to work as handcraft 
producers and to produce α units for the market or to produce a subsistence crop γ. 
Thieves must decide whether to steal from producers or from other thieves. The first 
stage decision is taken simultaneously by all adults in the economy and is irreversible. 
The second decision, however, is reversible in that thieves can always switch from 
stealing from producers to stealing from thieves, and producers can always switch 
                                                 
5
 In Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) these products are called 'cash crop' and a 'subsistence crop', 
but otherwise they act the same way as our products. 
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from handcraft producers to subsistent crop producers and vice versa (see Figure 1 
below).6  
Figure 1 
 
Henceforth, we denote the number of decent adults in the economy by λ (where 
0≤λ≤1), and the number of indecent individuals who decide to be engaged in theft by 
δ  (where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1-λ). The expected income of individuals who are engaged in the 
handcraft activity negatively depends on δ; thus ( )δδβα −−= 1u . Furthermore, if the 
number of indecent individuals who are engaged in theft (δ) is sufficiently small such 
that β
γα
δ
δ −
− <1 then ( ) γβα δδ >− −1 and handcraft production is more lucrative than crop 
production. Under such conditions thieves' income is β. 
If the number of indecent individuals who are engaged in theft rises such that 
β
γα
δ
δ −
− ≥1 then the net income from handcraft production falls to  ( ) γβα δδ ≤− −1 . 
However, since individuals who are engaged in productive activity can always switch 
to subsistence crop γ, thieves have an incentive to start stealing from themselves. 
                                                 
6
 The assumption that the adults' decision in the second stage is reversible was made to simplify the 
model and to support an equilibrium that is consistent with that of Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993). 
The results of the paper also carry through with the assumption that the decision in the second stage is 
irreversible; however each handcraft producer can ensure himself γ  units of output. 
Become a thief Become a producer  
Stealing from 
producers  
Stealing from 
thieves 
Handcraft 
producer  
Crop producer   
Stage 2 
(Reversible decision)  
 
Stage 1 
(Irreversible decision) 
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Under such conditions thieves' expected income becomes )()( 1δδγα −⋅−  which 
decreases as their number grows. From the analysis above, we conclude that the 
utility of producers as a function of δ is given by: 
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and the utility of thieves as a function of δ is given by: 
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Figures 2-a, 2-b and 2-c below show the utility level of decent and indecent 
individuals as a function of δ in the hypothetical case where λδ −=1 . Figure 2-a 
presents the case where β<γ, Figure 2-b presents the case where α<β and Figure 2-c 
presents the case where γ<β<α. We now show how equilibrium is determined in each 
case as a function of λ . 
 
Case 1:  β<γ  
In this case the return from theft is very low since the maximum amount that 
each thief may obtain is lower than the crop producers' output. Here the poverty trap 
does not exist since the strategy of becoming a thief is strictly dominated by the 
strategy of becoming a producer (regardless of λ ). Under such conditions, all adults 
become handcraft producers, and the economy's output is α (see the dashed gray line 
BA in Figure 1-a below). 
Figure 2-a (case 1) 
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Case 2: β>α  
In this case the maximum amount that a thief can expropriate is higher than the 
maximum output of any productive activity and so output depends on the number of 
indecent adults λ−1 . If λ−1 is relatively low then the economy produces high output 
(close to α). If, on the other hand, λ−1 is relatively high, the economy is trapped in 
poverty and produces low output (close to γ ). 
 Specifically, 
• If ]1,( γβα βλ −+∈  then all λ  decent individuals become handcraft producers and 
earn ( ) γβα δδ >− −1  while 1-λ  indecent individuals become thieves and earn β 
(see lines CD and C'D in Figure 2-b below). 
• If [ ]γβα βαγλ −+∈ ,  then all λ  decent individuals become producers and earn γ,  
while 1-λ  indecent individuals become thieves and earn γγα λλ >⋅− − )()( 1 (see 
lines CB and C'B in Figure 2-b below). 
α 
γ 
β 
γβα
β
−+ 
0 1  λ 
Producers' utility  
Thieves' utility 
A B 
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• If ),0[ αγλ∈  then all individuals (decent and indecent) earn γ.λ  decent 
individuals as well as λα
γ −  indecent individuals become handcraft producers 
and produce α units, while α
γ−1  indecent individuals become thieves (see 
point B in Figure 2-b below).  
In order to understand this equilibrium note that when 1-λ is lower than 
γβα
γα
−+
− (i.e., λ is higher than γβα β −+ ), all indecent adults who become thieves gain β 
units of output which is higher than the return to any productive activity (see the line 
DC  in Figure 2-b below). Thus, the dominant strategy of indecent adults' is to 
become thieves, while all decent individuals are better off producing α since their net 
income is ( ) γβα δδ >− −1  (see the line DC ′  in Figure 2-b below).  
If the number of indecent adults 1-λ is equal to γβα
γα
−+
−
 then ( ) γβα δδ =− −1 , and 
each producer is indifferent between being a handcraft producer or crop producer (see 
points C' in Figure 2-b below). However, when the number of indecent adults 1-λ 
exceeds γβα
γα
−+
− but is still lower than α
γα −
 (i.e., )γβα βαγ λ −+<< then thieves cannot steal 
more than  )( γα −  from each handcraft producers since handcraft producers can 
switch from handcraft to crops. Under such conditions, thieves start to steal from each 
other and obtain an income γγα λλ >⋅− − )()( 1 .7  
When 1-λ is higher than α
γα −
 (i.e., αγλ <≤0 ) then, as illustrated by the line BO 
in Figure 2-b below, )()( 1 λλγα −⋅− must be lower than γ and therefore the economy is 
trapped in poverty and produces only γ. Under such conditions, only α
γ−1 indecent 
                                                 
7
 This outcome follows from two alternative (and equivalent) assumptions: one, that adults' decisions in 
the second stage is reversible, or two that adults' decisions in the second stage is irreversible, however,  
each handcraft producer can always ensure himself γ units of output.  
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individuals can ensure an income of γ units as thieves, while λ  decent and 
λα
γ − indecent individuals ensure at most an income of γ  units of output as producers.   
 
Figure 2-b (case 2) 
 
 
 
 
Case 3: γ<β<α 
 Since β<α, indecent adults have an incentive to become producers rather than 
thieves. A possible Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile in which even for high 
levels of indecency every adult becomes anα producer (as represented by the gray 
dashed line  AB). However, this equilibrium is unreasonable because if each indecent 
individual believes that there are other indecent individuals who are irrational he will 
choose to steal. Interestingly, this equilibrium is unstable even if indecent individuals 
believe that other indecent individuals might think that they are irrational or that other 
β  
α  
γ  
γβα
β
−+ 
0 1  λ 
Thieves' utility 
Producers' utility 
α
γ
 
D 
C'  B A 
C  
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indecent individuals believe that other indecent individuals are irrational etc. 
Therefore, we do not analyze this equilibrium.8 
There exists another Nash equilibrium in which all indecent adults become 
thieves. Such an equilibrium can arise when the number of indecent individuals is 
sufficiently high and the above equilibrium is unstable.  In this equilibrium output 
depends on λ as follows: 
• If ]1,(αβλ∈  then all individuals (decent and indecent) become 
handcraft producers and earn a net income α  (see the gray dashed 
line BC in Figure 2-c below).  
• If ),[ αβγβα βλ −+∈  then all λ  decent adults become handcraft producers 
while 1-λ  indecent adults become thieves and earn income β. Each 
decent adult earns a net expected income of ( ) γβα δδ >− −1  (see lines 
ED and E'D in Figure 2-c below). 
• If ),[ γβα βαγλ −+∈  then all indecent adults operate as thieves. They start 
to crowd each other and operate below their full potential such that 
their income becomes )()( 1 λλγα −⋅− . Decent adults earn net income γ  
(see lines EF and E'F in Figure 2-c below). 
• If ),0[ αγλ∈  then λ  decent adults as well as λαγ −  indecent adults 
become handcraft producers producing α units of output, while α
γ−1  
indecent individuals become thieves (see dashed gray line GF in 
Figure 2-c below).  
Figure 2-c (case 3) 
                                                 
8
 Besides being unstable, this equilibrium yields no deep economic insights. 
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3. Education for good character  
The previous equilibria considered here were without taking education into 
account. We now reconsider these equilibria by introducing education to the model. 
 
3.1 A dynamic model with no social effect 
Education affects the economy in two ways: First, it positively affects the 
probability of a child who attends school to become a decent adult. Second, education 
has a potential time saving value as it can free households' time otherwise used for 
child rearing. We henceforth label the potential time saving value of education by the 
'babysitter effect'. We denote the 'lost time' (i.e., the number of hours devoted to child 
rearing) by z. Thus, when our production of the subsistence crop was earlier denoted 
by γ, we now denote the same level of production by (1-z)γ.  
There are also expenses associated with education (such as salaries for teachers 
etc.). We henceforth denote these expenses by e. A poor economy has two possible 
levels of production: (1-z)⋅γ if there is no education and γ-e if there is. If (1-z)⋅γ < γ-e 
α  
β 
γ  
γβα
β
−+ 
0 1  λ  α
β
 α
γ
 
Producers' utility  
Thieves' utility 
A B C 
D E 
F G E' 
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then the babysitter effect dominates the costs of schooling and therefore the output 
gained by sending children to schools is higher than the individual cost of childcare. 
Under such conditions, individuals will optimally choose to send their children to 
schools, and an economy that starts with a low level of λ and is trapped in poverty 
(see cases 2 and 3 above), might escape from its poverty trap despite the fact that the 
long-run effect of education on moral character is ignored by individuals. 
A more involved situation is when the babysitter effect is weak (i.e., (1-z)⋅γ > γ-
e) in which case individuals are better off by not sending their children to schools. In 
this case, if γ<β then an economy that starts with a low level of λ is trapped in 
poverty (see cases 2 and 3 above) and cannot escape unless the government has a long 
run view, and compels education. The government might consider the long run effect 
of education on decency (and eventually on output), but this effect cannot be taken 
into consideration by short term utility maximizers in this economy. 
If an education system were to start for some reason it would pay itself in the 
long run in two ways: 1) by increasing λ, thereby changing the equilibrium output 
from (1-z)γ to (1-z)α  and 2) when the output is already (1-z)α, it might also be true  
that (1-z)α>α-e, since α>γ. 
 We now explain the dynamics of education and decency. 
Assumption 1: From now on we shall assume that when output is γ,  the cost of 
education is sufficiently high to offset the babysitter effect. Namely, γze > always 
holds. This assumption implies that in poor economies, introducing an education 
system is not individually incentive compatible. Thus, if, for some reason, the 
government is interested in starting a public education system, it must finance it either 
through tax or thorough a government loan. For the sake of simplicity, we limit our 
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discussion at present to taxes only, and assume that if a government establishes a 
public education system then it finances it by taxing e units per capita.  
Assumption 2: From now on we assume that when output is α, the babysitter 
effect dominates the cost of education. Namely, ze ⋅<α  ( ) )1(
2
2 ze p
q −−−< γβα . 
 
The dynamics of education and decency 
The probability that a child becomes a decent adult depends on two variables: 
1) his parent's moral type, 2) schooling (denoted by }1,0{∈ed ) where 0=ed denotes 
no public schooling and  1=ed  denotes public schooling.  
A) The probability of a child to become a decent adult is 1-Q(ed) if he was born 
to a decent parent, where 



=<<
=<<
=
10
010)(
12
1
edqq
edq
edQ    (4) 
B) The probability of a child to become a decent adult if he was born to an 
indecent parent is given by:  



=<<
=<<
=
11
010)(
21
1
edpp
edp
edP    (5) 
Assumption 3: 1221 ppqq −≥− .
9
  
If all children attend school then the dynamic system that describes how the 
population of decent individuals evolves is given by:   
)1( 2212 qpp tt −−+= −λλ     (6) 
If, on the other hand, there is no schooling, then the dynamic system is given by: 
)1( 1111 qpp tt −−+= −λλ     (7) 
                                                 
9
 Education is at least as effective for improving the moral character of children who were born to 
decent parents as it is for children who were born to indecent parents. 
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Figure 3 
 
Each dynamic system has a unique globally stable stationary equilibrium (see Figure 
3 above): 
where there is no education:  
11
1* qp
p
ne +=λ  and,  
where there is education:  
22
2* qp
p
e +=λ . 
The dynamics in Figure 3 and equations (6) and (7) illustrate how education that aims 
to improve moral character can affect the long run distribution of decent and indecent 
individuals.  
Proposition 1: Suppose that e  is sufficiently lower than z⋅α  so that 
( ) )1(
2
2 ze p
q −−−< γβα . Then the following statements hold: 
(i) When β<γ<α  there is no poverty trap and therefore public education changes 
the output only due to the babysitter effect. Output will rise from )1( z−α to 
e−α . 
tλ  
1−tλ
2p
450 
22
2* qp
p
e +=λ  
1p
11
1* qp
p
ne +=λ  
With schooling 
Without schooling 
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(ii) When γ<β<α , if  αγλ ≤= + 11 1* qp
p
ne  then: 
a) If  αβγβα β λ ≤<−+ *e  then, in the long run, production will rise from )1( z−γ  
to ( ) epq −− 22βα  and eventually only 22 2*)1( qp qe +=− λ individuals will steal 
(see Figure 4-a below). 
b) If, *eλαβ < , then, in the long run, production will rise  from )1( z−γ  to 
e−α  and no individuals will steal (see Figure 4-a below). 
(iii) When γ<α<β  if  αγλ ≤*ne and >*eλ γβα β −+ then as in case ((ii)-a), in the long 
run,  production will rise from  )1( z−γ  to ( ) epq −− 22βα  and only 
22
2*)1( qp qe +=− λ individuals will steal (see Figure 4-b below). 
Proof: Follows immediately from equations (1)-(7) and assumptions 1, 2 and 3.  
Note: Figures 4-a and 4-b explain both the levels of pre- and post-education income. 
To clarify these figures, we used the notations α,β and γ, and not the pre-schooling 
levels α(1-z) ,β(1-z) and )1( z−γ  or the post schooling levels of α-e, β-e and e−γ . 
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Figure 4-a 
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Figure 4-b 
 
In the dynamic analysis above, the equilibrium with no schooling is largely 
driven by two fundamental factors. First, in poor economies, the babysitter effect is 
dominated by the cost of education. Second, there exists an intergenerational market 
failure in which households in future generations cannot compensate the present 
α  
β 
γ  
γβα
β
−+ 0 1  λ  α
γ
 
0 1  22
2* qp
p
e +=λ  11
1* qp
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ne +=λ  
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2p
α
γ
 γβα
β
−+ 
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generation for the expansion of resources required to establish an education system. 
Under such conditions, the state has an important, if not a crucial, role in preventing 
an underdevelopment trap.  
In the analysis above we illustrated how a tax-funded public education system 
can pull an economy with low a level of decency out of poverty. However, this form 
of financing detrimentally affects the present consumers in order to achieve growth. 
Thus, a policy that, on one hand, would be a strict Pareto improvement, and, on the 
other hand, will pull the economy out of its underdevelopment trap is to form a 
mechanism that will substitute the missing intergenerational market for loans. If the 
world interest rate is sufficiently low, the government can take foreign loans to fund 
the public education system. The government uses the borrowed resources from all 
periods until the steady state of high production equilibrium is reached to return the 
loan. When the high production equilibrium is reached and the babysitter effect 
dominates the cost of education an education tax can be introduced. Under our 
assumptions the allocation of resources in this equilibrium Pareto dominates the 
allocation when an education system is absent.  
 
Public education versus the police 
We have demonstrated that the public education policy might affect the 
economy's output. This effect, however, applies only in the long run while in the short 
run it is possible that education will not change output at all. We may therefore be 
interested in analyzing another policy that may reduce crime rates and raise output in 
the short run, namely, law enforcement and policing.  
Let us assume that a police force can reduce the thieves' potential income 
from β  to εββ −='  where ε  is an increasing function of the public expenditure on 
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the police force denoted by c, where 0)0( >ε .10Let us also assume that before a 
police force is introduced, there is no public education system and the long run 
stationary equilibrium is 
11
1* qp
p
ne +=λ .We examine three cases: 
In the case where β<γ<α , theft does not pay more than any type of productive 
activity and therefore the unique equilibrium is where all adults, decent and indecent, 
produce α. In this equilibrium, output is not improved with the introduction of a 
police force, and furthermore, the police force costs c. For this case, it is never 
worthwhile to introduce a police force.  
When α
γλ ≤= + 11
1* qp
p
ne  then in the two cases where γ<β<α and γ<α<β a police 
force might be efficient in increasing output only if the police manages to sufficiently 
reduce β. This happens only if the following proposition holds. 
Proposition 2: Suppose that α
γλ ≤= + 11
1* qp
p
ne  and γ<β a police force has a positive 
effect on output if and only if there exists γβ <′  such that 
( ) ))(1(1 γαββε −−<′−− z . 
Proof:  If the police force is sufficiently effective so that γβ ≤′  then there will be no 
thieves and output will change from    γ)1( z−  to cz −− α)1( .  
The police force will therefore have a positive effect on output if and only if  
)()1()1( 1 ββεαγ ′−−−<− −zz  (note that )(1 ββε ′−= −c ) if and only if 
))(1()(1 γαββε −−<′−− z . 
 
                                                 
10
 Alternatively, we may assume that the police does not reduce thieves' potential income β  but rather 
increase the probability of a thief to be caught and fined or imprisoned. This is equivalent to the model 
outlined above, and the results of the model therefore carry through. 
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If Proposition 2 does not hold (i.e., if ( ) ))(1(1 γαββε −−≥′−− z  for all γβ <′ ) 
then introducing a police force will not improve production. Then, only a public 
education system can pull the economy out of its poverty trap. From now on we 
discuss the case where proposition 2 holds. 
Even if Proposition 2 holds, the introduction of a police force has no long-term 
effect on output. The police force can only reduce the number of active thieves in 
each period separately but cannot reduce the number of indecent adults in the 
population. Note also that cost c has to be paid separately in each and every period. 
Once public funding of the police is stopped, the number of thieves immediately 
returns to its previous level.  However, if ez −<− αα)1(  and Proposition 2 holds 
then once a police force is active, it is a dominant strategy for every individual to pay 
for a public education system.  
When γ<β<α, if a police force is introduced in the non education case, lowering 
β will not help. As long as β>γ, there will be stealing in the economy, and output will 
not change. In the public education case, it is also not worthwhile to have a police 
force, because in this case the output is already α, and only goes down to α-c with the 
introduction of the police. 
For the case where γ<α<β,  here too if we start with no education, lowering β 
will not help unless we can lower it below γ. However, if we are at the 'educated' level 
and we manage to lower β so that it falls below α, the police will make production 
rise to α-c-e which might well be higher than ( ) epq −− 22βα . 
From this analysis we may conclude that policing is ineffective in most cases, 
and is effective only after the introduction of public education. 
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3.2 A dynamic model with social effects  
Decency and indecency do not only reflect personal moral traits, but also 
cultural norms and values that pass on from one generation to the next through social 
interactions between the old and the young. We now introduce a model where this 
social effect is another determinant of moral character. In this new setting, the impact 
of education is manifested not only in its direct effect on individuals' moral character, 
as modeled above, but also in its indirect feedback on cultural legacies.   
We show that interactions between decent adults and young individuals might 
lead to a threshold effect. If the number of decent individuals λ  is below some 
critical point, the level of interaction between decent adults and young individuals is 
low, λ declines, and the economy is trapped in poverty. If, on the other hand, λ is 
slightly above that critical point, then the interaction between decent adults and young 
individuals is sufficiently high, λ  rises, and the economy grows to a high level of 
decency and output.  
When the number of indecent individuals λ−1  is high and the economy is 
trapped in poverty, compulsory schooling that educates children to high morality 
might negate the threshold effect and therefore pull the economy out of poverty. 
Furthermore, unlike the model without social effect, when λ exceeds a certain critical 
point, public education is no longer needed. 
 We start our analysis with the following assumptions: 
 
Assumption 4: The probability that a child who was born at period t will become a 
decent adult at period t+1 is affected by three factors: 
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(4-a) Social interaction 
 When the number of decent adults a child interacts with is high, the probability 
that the child will become a decent adult increases. We denote this social effect 
by )( 1−tso λ .  
(4-b) The parental effect  
A child who was born at period t to a decent parent is more likely to become 
decent at period t+1 than a child who was born to an indecent parent. We denote 
by 0)( 1 >−tg λ the average parental effect representing the difference between 
having a decent and an indecent parent, and by 11)( −− ttg λλ  the total parental 
effect. We assume that the total parental effect 11)( −− ttg λλ is a monotonically 
increasing function of 1−tλ .
11
  
 (4-c) The schooling effect 
The probability that a child who was born at period t will become a decent adult 
at period t+1 increases if he attends school. We denote this effect by )( 1−te λ . We 
assume that when λ  rises, the schooling effect weakens. Thus, )( 1−te λ is a 
decreasing function of 1−tλ . 
We further assume that: 
(4-d) The probability of a child to become a decent adult is a monotonically non-
decreasing function of 1−tλ  in all cases. Thus, p1,p2,p3, and p4 as presented in 
Table 1 below are monotonically non-decreasing and strictly smaller than 1. 
 
 
                                                 
11
 This assumption implies that the elasticity of the average parental effect with respect to the number 
of decent adults at period t is higher or equal to minus one(i.e., )( )( 1 111 − −−
⋅′≤−
t
tt
g
g
λ
λλ ). 
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Table 1 
A child who was born to an 
indecent parent and did not 
attend school 
A child who was born to a decent 
parent and did not attend school 
A child who was born to an indecent 
parent and attended school 
A child who was born to a decent parent and attended 
school 
321
effectsocial
tsop )( 11 −= λ  321321
effectParental
t
effectsocial
t gsop )()( 112 −− += λλ
 
321321
effectSchooling
t
effectsocial
t esop )()( 113 −− += λλ
 
321321321
effectSchooling
t
effectParental
t
effectsocial
t egsop )()()( 1114 −−− ++= λλλ
 
 
Assumption 5 The functions )( 1−tso λ  and )( 1−tg λ  satisfy the following conditions: 
(5-a) )( 1−tso λ  is a monotonically increasing convex function, and differentiable at 
least three times.  
(5-b) ε=)0(so ,    η=)1(so         where 10 <<< ηε  
(5-c) 0)0( =′os   and     0)0( >′′os     
(5-d) )( 1−tg λ  is a weakly concave function and differentiable at least three times. 
(5-e) 0)0( >g  and   0)0( =′g  
Figure 5 shows possible instances of )( 1−tso λ  and )( 1−tg λ . 
 
Figure 5 
 
 
 
)( 1−tso λ  
)( 1−te λ  
)( 1−tg λ  
Social effect 
1−tλ  1−t
λ  
1−tλ  
Average parental effect 
(per decent adult) 
Schooling effect 
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If there is no public education, decency evolves according to the following 
difference equation: 
 
43421321
effectparentalTotal
tt
effectSocial
t
tt
gso )()(
)(
111
1
−−−
−
⋅+=
=
λλλ
λψλ
                          (8) 
whereas with public education, decency evolves according to:   
32143421321
effectSchooling
t
effectparentalTotal
tt
effectparentalSocial
t
ttt
egso
e
)()()(
)()(
1111
11
−−−−
−−
+⋅+=
+=
λλλλ
λλψλ
                    (9) 
From assumptions (4-b) and (5-a) it follows immediately that the dynamical system 
presented in equation (8) is monotonically increasing. 
 
Proposition 3: The dynamical system described in equation (8) has at least one non-
trivial stationary equilibrium. 
 
Proof:  Let us define:  
[ ] )(1)(
)()(
111
111
−−−
−−−
+−⋅≡
−=
ttt
ttt
sog
G
λλλ
λλψλ
 
Obviously, 
[ ] 0)())0((1)0(0)0( >==+−⋅= εososogG  
[ ] 01)1()1())1((1)1(1)1( <−−=+−⋅= gsosogG  
Since )( 1−tG λ is a continuous function, according to the Intermediate Value Theorem 
there exists at least one point )1,0(∈λ  such that 0)( =λG , and there is at least one 
stationary equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 4: If the conditions (1)-(3) below hold, then the equation (8) has an S-
shape as is shown in the Figure 6 below: 
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1) 
{
0)1()1(2)1()1(
)()()(
<′′+′+′′=
+−−
321321
osggH  
2) 0)( 1 ≤′′′ −tos λ  
3) 0)( 1 ≤′′′ −tg λ  
Proof: The second derivative of the difference equation )( 1−= tt λψλ is given by 
)()(2)()( 11111 −−−−− ′′+′+′′⋅= ttttt osggH λλλλλ  
)0()0(2)0(0)0( osggH ′′+′+′′⋅=  
)1()1(2)1()1( osggH ′′+′+′′=  
According to assumptions (5-a) and (5-e) 
 0)0( >H  
Due to the first assumption in this proposition, H(1)<0. 
Note also that the third derivative of the difference equation 
)()(3)()( 11111 −−−−− ′′′+′′+′′′⋅=′ ttttt osggH λλλλλ is not positive, and therefore the second 
derivative is monotonically non-increasing. Thus, according to the Intermediate Value 
Theorem there exists a single )1,0(ˆ∈λ such that the difference equation )( 1−= tt λψλ  is 
convex for all ]ˆ,0[1 λλ ∈−t , and concave for all ]1,ˆ[1 λλ ∈−t . 
 
Multiple equilibria poverty traps and education 
Suppose that as in case 3 above in which αβγ << , the equilibrium aggregate 
output is determined by the number of decent individuals. Suppose also that 
assumptions (4) and (5) as well as the conditions in Proposition 5 hold, and therefore 
the dynamical system )( 1−= tt λψλ  is an S-shaped monotonically non-decreasing 
function. We also assume that the probability functions )( 1−tso λ and )( 1−tg λ are such 
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that the dynamical system )( 1−= tt λψλ has three stationary equilibria, where two are 
locally stable.12 See points *1λ , *2λ and  *3λ  in Figure 6 below.  
Figure 6 displays the evolution of decency as well as the return to each 
occupation. When the number of decent individuals at period t=0 is lower than *2λ , 
the size of the population of decent adults converges to the low stationary equilibrium 
level α
γλ <*1 , and in the long run,  the economy is trapped in poverty with output per 
capita γ . If, on the other hand, the number of decent individuals is even slightly 
higher than *2λ , the size of the population of decent adults will converge to the high 
stationary equilibrium level αβλ >*3 , and in the long run the economy grows  to a 
high level (α ) of output per capita (see Figure 6). 
Figure 7 below presents the effect of public education on the evolution of 
decency and output. If the schooling effect is sufficiently high, it negates the threshold 
effect. Under such conditions, the role of education is to pull the economy out of 
poverty by creating a sufficient level of decency that raises the number of decent 
adults to above *2λ . After level *2λ  has been reached, public education is no longer 
needed since the social intergenerational interaction effect will be sufficient to raise 
the per capita output to α on its own. Thus, unlike the case without social effect, in 
order to pull the economy out of its poverty trap, investment in public education is 
needed only for a limited time. 
 
 
   
                                                 
12
 it is easy to verify that the functions 
 
2
18
1
8
1
1 )()( −− += ttso λλ    and   ( ) ( )2211250692011581)( +−+= −−− tttg λλλ satisfy assumptions (4) and 
(5), and that the dynamical system created by these functions has three stationary equilibria , where two 
are locally stable.  
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Figure 6 
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Figure 7 
 
 
 
 
 
α  
β 
γ  
γβα
β
−+ 
0 1  λ  α
β
 α
γ
 
Producers' utility  
Thieves' utility 
A B C 
D E 
F G E' 
1−tλ  
tλ  
)( 1−= tt λψλ  
*1λ  *2λ  *3λ  
 32
4. Concluding remarks 
This paper shows how public education may increase output by increasing 
decency and reducing rent seeking behavior.  
The study demonstrates that the distribution of decency, or more specifically the 
percentage of decent individuals in the economy, significantly affects aggregate 
economic activity. It also shows that public education that educates infants to decent 
behavior might affect this distribution in the long run and therefore might have a long 
run effect on the macroeconomic equilibrium.  
We studied two cases: one, where decency is not affected by cultural norms, and 
the other, where decency is affected by cultural norms and values that pass from one 
generation to the next through social interactions between old and young individuals. 
 For the first case, if initially governments do not invest in public education and 
do not compel schooling, the economy will be trapped in poverty, since parents do not 
have an incentive to send their children to schools. Once the government does invest 
in public education, decency will increase and output will rise. Under such conditions, 
continual schooling will keep output at high levels. 
In the second case where decency is affected by cultural norms and values that 
pass from one generation to the next, we found that if the number of decent 
individuals is below some critical point, then the level of interaction between decent 
adults and young individuals is low, the number of decent individuals declines and the 
economy is trapped in poverty. If, on the other hand, the number of decent individuals 
is slightly above that critical point, the interaction between decent adults and young 
individuals is sufficiently high, the number of decent individuals rises and the 
economy will grow reaching to a high level of decency and output. Thus, compulsory 
schooling in poor economies is needed only for a limited time. When the number of 
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decent individuals exceeds a critical point, education for good character is no longer 
needed. Further research may shed light on this mechanism by which education 
affects decency and growth.  
 
References 
 
Acemoglu, Daron and Angrist, Joshua. (2000) “How Large Are Human Capital 
Externalities? Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Laws” in B. Bernanke and K. 
Rogoff, (eds)., NBER macroeconomics annual, Vol. 15. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
pp. 9-59. 
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A.  (2000) “Why did the West Extend the 
Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 115(4), 1167-1199. 
 
Acemoglu, Daron; Johnson, Simon; Robinson, James. (2005) “Institutions as the 
Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth”, in Aghion, Philippe; Durlauf, Steven. 
(eds), Handbook of Economic Growth Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Barro, Robert J. (1991) “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 106:407–43. 
Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. (1992) “Convergence”, Journal of 
Political Economy 100 223–51.  
Barro, J.Robert. (1997). “Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country 
Empirical Study”. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, (1995) “Economic Growth”, New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
Becker, Gary S. (1965) “A Theory of the Allocation of Time”, Economic Journal, 
75, pp.493-517. 
 
Becker, Gary S. (1993) “Human Capital”, third ed. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
Ben-Porath, Yoram. (1967) “The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle 
of Earnings”, Journal of Political Economy, 75, pp. 352-365. 
 34
Besley, Timothy; Ghatak, Maitreesh. (2009) “Property Rights and Economic 
Development” Working Paper 
 
Buonanno, Paolo; Leonida, Leone. (2006) “Education and crime: evidence from 
Italian regions”, Applied Economics Letters, 2006, 13, 709–713 
 
Buonanno, Paolo; Leonida, Leone. (2009) “Non-market effects of education on 
crime: Evidence from Italian regions”, Economics of Education Review pp. 11–17. 
 
Caselli, Francesco. (2005) “Accounting for Cross-Country Income Differences”, 
in Philippe Aghion and and Steven Durlauf (eds), Handbook of Economic Growth, 
Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Chong, Alberto; Calderon, Cesar. (2000). “Causality and feedback between 
institutional measures and economic growth”. Economics and Politics 12,pp  69– 82. 
 
Douglass, North C. (1981) “Structure and Changes in economic history”, New 
York.  
Ehrlich, Isaac. (1975) “On the relation between education and crime”. In Juster, F. 
T.(ed.) Education, Income, and Human Behavior. Pp 313-338. New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Co. 
 Galor, Oded; Moav, Omer. (2004) “From Physical to Human Capital 
Accumulation: Inequality and the Process of Development”. Review of Economic 
Studies, 71, 1001-1026  
Galor, Oded; Moav, Omer. (2006) “Das Human Kapital: A Theory of the Demise 
of the Class Structure”, Review of Economic Studies, 73.  
Galor, Oded; Zeira, Joseph. (1993) “Income Distribution and Macroeconomics” 
The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 60, No. 1 pp. 35-52  
Gilligan, Carol. (1982) “In a Different Voice”, Harvard University Press. 
Gradstein, Mark. (2003)  “Governance and growth”, Journal of Development 
Economics , pp 505– 518  
 
Grossman, Herschel I; Kim, Minseong. (1995) “Swords or Plowshares? A Theory 
of the Security of Claims to Property” The Journal of Political Economy, , pp. 1275-
1288 
 
Hall, Robert,E; Jones, Charles, I; (1999). “Why do some countries produce so 
much more output per worker than others?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, pp 
83–116. 
 35
Knack, Stephen; Keefer, Philip. (1997) “Does Social Capital Have an Economic 
Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 
112, Pages 1251-1288. 
Knack, Stephen; Keefer, Philip. (1997) “Does Social Capital Have an Economic 
Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 
112, Pages 1251-1288. 
Knack, Stephen; Keefer, Philip.(1995), “Institutions and economic performance: 
cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures”, Economics and Politics, 
pp. 207-227 
 
Knack, Stephen; Keefer, Philip.(2005), “Institutions and economic performance: 
cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures”, Economics and Politics, 
pp. 207-227 
 
Kohlberg, Lawrence (1973). “The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of 
Moral Judgment”, Journal of Philosophy 70: 630–646. 
Lochner, Lance; Moretti, Enrico. (2004) “The Effect of Education on Crime: 
Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports”, The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 94, pp. 155-189. 
Lucas, Robert E. (1988) “On the Mechanics of Economic Development”, Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 22, pp. 3-42. 
 
Mauro, Paolo. (1995) “Corruption and growth”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
pp 681– 712. 
Mincer, Jacob. (1974) “Schooling, Experience and Earnings”, New York: National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Murphy, Kevin M.; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W. (1993) “Why is rent 
seeking so costly to growth?”, The American Economic Review Vol. 83 No 2.  
Nelson, Richard R; Phelps, Edmund S. (1966) “Investment in Humans, 
Technological Diffusion, and Economic Growth”, American Economic Review, 56, 
pp. 69-75. 
North, Douglass C. (1990) “Institutions, Institutional change, and Economic 
Performance”,  Cambridge University Press, New York. 
North, Douglass C. and Robert P. Thomas (1973) “The Rise of the Western 
World: A New Economic History”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK 
Norton. 
 36
Pande, Rohini; Udry, Christopher. (2005) “Institutions and Development: A View 
from Below”, Working Papers 928. 
Pande, Rohini; Udry, Christopher. (2005) “Institutions and Development: A View 
from Below”, Working Papers 928. 
Piaget, Jean (1932). “The Moral Judgment of the Child”, London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trubner and Co. 
 Puech Frédéric (2005). “Education, Inequality and Violent Crime in Minas 
Gerais”. Working Paper http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwphe/0509006.htm 
Schultz, Theodore W. (1965) “Investing in Poor People: An Economist's View”, 
The American Economic Review, Vol. 55, No. 1/2, pp. 510-520. 
Shweder, Richard A; Mahapatra, Manamohan; Miller, Joan G. (1990) “Culture 
and moral development” in Kagan, Jerome;  Lamb, Sharon. (eds.) “The emergence of 
morality in young children”, the University of Chicago Press.  
Svensson, J., 1998. Investment, property rights, and political instability: theory 
and evidence. European Economic Review 42, 1317–1341. 
 
Tornell, Aaron. (1997). “Economic growth and decline with endogenous property 
rights” Journal of Economic Growth 2, 219– 250. 
 
Tornell, Aaron. (1999). “The voracity effect”. American Economic Review 89,pp 
22–46. 
 
Turiel, Elliot. (1998) “The Development of Morality”, in Handbook of Child 
Psychology. 
Zeira, Joseph. (2009) “Why and How Education Affects Economic Growth”, 
Review of International Economics, 17(3), 602–614. 
